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ABSTRACT 
This article offers an examination of FOCAC as a framework for Sino-African engagement in the 21
st
 
Century. China‟s growing and expanding engagement with Africa has assumed a prominent feature of 
International Relations and discourses. The engagement is multifaceted, encapsulating mainly trade 
and related economic ties. Given China‟s fast economic and industrial growth, thirst and huge demand 
for new sources of energy and other resources has been generated, bringing China closer to Africa 
where the availability of these resources abound. This situates China‟s renewed interest in Africa since 
the 21
st
 Century. The deepening of economic involvement in Africa is realized through a mix of aid, 
special concessions, debt relief, scholarships, the provision of educational and medical training 
personnel and infrastructural investment projects. This represents a stark departure from the past 
under Mao Zedong, when the relationship was guided by the ideological conflict of the Cold War and 
especially Beijing‟s attempts to dislodge Moscow‟s influence in the Third World. Now economic 
pragmatism and symbolic diplomacy appear to navigate Sino-African relations. The lynchpin of 
China‟s re-engagement of African in this century is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), initiated at the Ministerial Conference in Beijing in 2000. The article explores the FOCAC 
framework, assesses the reality of its promises, and addresses the question of its problems and 
challenges. The findings are that China‟s increased presence in Africa under the FOCAC framework 
has been faced with criticisms and confrontations, but the forum has equally strengthened bilateral 
economic relationship between China and Africa, and has provided platform for Beijing to become a 
serious humanitarian benefactor to Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
China‟s growing and expanding engagement with Africa has assumed a prominent feature of 
International Relations and discourses. The engagement is multifaceted, encapsulating mainly 
trade and related economic ties. The search for natural resources explains the tremendous 
increase in Chinese trade and investment in Africa. China‟s growing economy, especially the 
industrial sector, and expansion in the global economy, demand enormous supplies of mineral 
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and energy resources, which are abundant in Africa. China has emerged as a prosperous 
nation and has grown by an average of 9% per annum over the last 25 years, the fastest 
growing rate for any major economy in recorded history. Recent reports suggest that China‟s 
growth rate will reach as high as 13% per annum (Rotberg 2008). Industrial output has also 
increased by almost 50%, creating industrial overproduction in sectors like electronics, 
textiles and footwear. This rapid expansion has created the need for both import markets for 
energy and raw materials, and export markets for Chinese manufactures. Of all natural 
resources that capture China‟s interest in Africa: oil, copper, iron ore, bauxite, uranium, 
aluminum, manganese, diamonds, etc, the most important is oil (Broadman, 2007). Oil makes 
up 62% of the total African exports to China, with Angola supplying 47% of the total, 
followed by Sudan supplying 25%, the DRC 13%, Equatorial Guinea 9% and Nigeria 3% 
(Broadman, 2007).  China‟s trade with Africa has increased tremendously within a short 
period. Trade has risen from $2bn in 1999 to $11bn in 2000, $12bn in 2002,$18bn in 
2003,$30bn in 2004, $40bn in 2005, to $5obn in 2006, and extending to $100 billion in 2008 
(Alden, 2005, Peiliang 2005, Taylor, 2006, Hellstrom 2009). China displaced European, 
American and Japanese diplomatic and capitalist soft power in many sub-Saharan African 
countries, winning influence in countries where Western governments were conspicuous by 
their absence.  
China‟s diplomatic offensive has been as thorough as its investments, trade, and aid 
advances. China has become the largest new investor, trader, buyer and aid donor in a select 
number of important African countries, and a major new economic force in sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole. China rivals United States for Angola‟s oil, controls most of the Sudan‟s 
oil, and is exploring energetically for oil onshore, and up and down the coasts offshore 
(Rotberg 2008). It is the major purchaser of timber from West Africa. About 40% of Africa‟s 
total export to Asia are to China, and about 30% of Asia‟s total exports to Africa are from 
China ().China imports timber from Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Cameroon and Liberia; cotton from Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d‟Ivoire, and 
Cameroon; copper from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo; ferrochrome and 
platinum from Zimbabwe; diamonds from South Africa; tin and tantalum from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. To the above named countries, China supplies electronic 
goods, machinery, motorcycle, clothing, footwear, and a host of additional low-value 
consumer items. China‟s share of Africa‟s total trade is rising and will soon eclipse America 
and European annual totals. 
The growing China –Africa ties is also visible in the number of high profile visits. The 
visit by the Chinese foreign Minister to Africa has become an annual event. It is on record 
that between 1963 and 2004, 93 Chinese leaders of foreign Ministers rank and above, paid 
150 visits to Africa, and about 450 African counterparts paid 609 visits to China (Ruchita 
2007). At the end of January 2007, Chinese president Hu Jintao launched a twelve-day tour of 
Africa covering eight countries: Cameroon, Namibia, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Sudan, 
South Africa, Zambia and Liberia. That was the second of its type in less than a year. In April 
2006, he visited Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya. These visits are not merely overtures on the 
part of China‟s leadership. They are illustrative of the premium that China places on its 
African engagements. The deepening of political and economic involvement in Africa is 
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realized through a mix of aid, special concessions, debt relief, scholarships, the provision of 
educational and medical training personnel and infrastructural investment projects. This 
represents a stark departure from the past under Mao Zedong, when the relationship was 
guided by the ideological conflict of the Cold War and especially Beijing‟s attempts to 
dislodge Moscow‟s influence in the Third World. Now economic pragmatism and symbolic 
diplomacy appear to navigate Sino-African relations. 
The lynchpin of Sino-African relations is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), initiated at the Ministerial Conference in Beijing in 2000. The Forum, driven by a 
joint Ministerial Conference held every three years since 2000, aims at fostering solidarity 
and cooperation based on equality, consultation, consensus, friendship, partnership and 
mutual benefit (Hellstrom 2009). It also emphasizes a planned cultivation of a long term 
relationship. In line with solidarity spirit and common interests, two main issues dominated at 
the conference. These are the establishment of a just and equitable new international political 
and economic order that promotes the interests of developing countries in the 21
st
 Century, 
and strengthening China-Africa cooperation in all spheres (Peiliang 2005). The outcomes of 
the conference included the Beijing Declaration and the Program for China-Africa 
Cooperation in Economic and Social Development which laid the basis of the strategic 
partnership in the new millennium. These underscore the significant purposes of 
China-Africa cooperation that of addressing both international and domestic factors 
associated with economic development, a departure from Africa‟s relations with the West. 
Three major goals of the Sino-Africa relationship, as contained in the Beijing 
Declaration, can be discerned. First, they desire to promote mutual economic development 
through the elimination of poverty of the majority of the population. This falls in neatly with 
the international community‟s preoccupation with poverty alleviation, which is at the top of 
the global agenda. Second, China and Africa seek to nurture their international 
competitiveness and capability in economic globalization as a means to elevate their status in 
international affairs. Third, they aim to develop cooperation to strengthen their bargaining 
stance with the North for the creation of a new, just and equitable international economic and 
political order. This should be seen in response to the failure of globalization to promote 
equal relations. The extent to which these three goals move beyond rhetoric depends on the 
implementation of the Beijing Declaration. The aim of this article is to historically 
contextualize FOCAC, explore its future in strengthening the relationship between China and 
Africa. It addresses the extent of reality of its commitments, promises, opportunities and 
challenges.  
 
BACKGROUND TO FOCAC 
 
With the unfolding realities of the immediate post Cold War era, the strengthening and 
institutionalizing relation between China and Africa was considered necessary to reflect the 
new impulses in the global South. The emergence of a uni-polar world order following the 
end of the Cold War became an immediate concern for the vast majority of developing 
countries in the South. The need to establish a new and fair international order, and to deal 
with the challenge of economic globalization was the overriding objectives for the developing 
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counties of the world. China is the largest developing country in the world, and Africa is the 
continent that continent with the largest concentration of developing countries. Therefore, the 
development of China-Africa relations under the framework of FOCAC is to be seen in this 
context. 
From the historical perspective, FOCAC should be seen as a continuum of the spirit of 
the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955 (Alden 2007). What the participating 
nations had in common was their shared history and perception of white dominance by the 
West (Foster et al, 2009; Looy, 2006). China and India were the two main drivers at the 
conference, pushing for newly independent states in the world not to become mired in the 
ideological battle of the Cold War. In essence, Bandung was also about the spirit of common 
prosperity, respect for equality, justice, peace and the overall development of the developing 
world, based on its independent status. The relevance today of the Bandung Conference and 
what it stood for can be seen as one of the central pillars informing China‟s foreign policy 
engagements with the developing world and indeed, China-Africa relations, with FOCAC 
becoming the platform where dialogue on cooperation and consultation in Sino-African 
strategic partnership is forged. 
The first Forum of China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) held in October 2000 in 
Beijing. The Forum focused on two major areas: how to promote and establish a just and 
equitable new international order, and to further strengthen co-operation between China and 
Africa on economic and social development. This has clearly demonstrated the new character 
of Sino-African relations in the new era. The Forum reached consensus on a wide range of 
issues and culminated in the adoption of two important policy documents: the Beijing 
Declaration, and the Programme of Cooperation on Economic and Social Development 
(Wenping 2006). It was also decided that there would be a ministerial conference held every 
three years, alternatively convened in China and Africa. The second FOCAC was held in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15-16 December 2003. The main task of the second meeting 
was to review the implementation of the two documents adopted at the first summit and to 
explore new ideas and measures to deepen cooperation in key fields such as human resources 
development, agriculture, infrastructure construction, investment and trade. The meeting 
concluded with the adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006, which reflected 
consensus by both sides on political issues and other important international issues of 
common concern (Hellstrom 2009). In particular, the Summit concretized ideas around 
strengthening cooperation in various fields over the next three years. Alongside the Addis 
Ababa Forum, the China-Africa Business Conference was also held. Representatives from 
nearly 100 Chinese enterprises discussed business opportunities and linkages with their 
African counterparts, which culminated in the signing of many contracts of intent to do 
business. At the end of 2006, the third Ministerial Meeting of the Forum, together with the 
first Sino-African Heads of States Summit, was held in Beijing from 3-5 November. The 
Summit was intended to focus on reducing debts, economic assistance, personal training and 
investment (Wenping 2006). The new impulse in China‟s strategic partnership with Africa 
was officially launched by two significant developments in 2006. The first was the release of 
the White Paper on China‟s African Policy, and the second was the speech that President Hu 
Jintao delivered at the Nigerian Congress during his April visit. In both, the reference to the 
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concept of developing a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership was made. Although 
it was not too clearly defined, it signaled the future course for Sino-African relations. In 
November 2009, about 50 African countries gathered at the Egyptian resort of Sharm 
el-Sheikh for the fourth FOCAC Ministerial Summit. At the opening ceremony of the fourth 
FOCAC Ministerial Conference, Premier Wen Jiaboa declared eight new measures to 
strengthen Sino-African cooperation, which included helping Africa to build up financing 
capacity, providing 10 billion US dollars concessional loans to promote African imports, 
construction of schools and hospitals, and training of African talents (ChinaAfrica 2009). 
The experience of FOCAC over the last nine years has proven to be an important 
platform and dialogue mechanism for strengthening China-Africa cooperation and solidarity, 
and safeguarding common interests. This approach to strengthening China-Africa relations is 
quite different from that which Africa has managed with its traditional development partners. 
With both sides observing that this relationship can only be a win-win situation, the future of 
China-Africa relations is definitely moving into an era of rapid development. 
 
FOCAC AND AFRICAN OPPORTUNITY   
 
Through the FOCAC process, China has cancelled Africa‟s debt, facilitated expanded market 
access and provided a wide range of new opportunities for positive engagement. FOCAC 
reflects the form and content of Sino-African relations while mapping a future for both sides 
to achieve common prosperity. Over the nine years of FOCAC‟s creation, China has through 
it, augmented its presence as an important trade and investment partner to Africa. Following 
the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, bilateral trade flows between China and the African 
continent have soared to approximately 40 billion US dollars in 2005, an eight-fold increase 
from 5 billion US dollars recorded in 1995 (Naidu 2007). It got to 100 billion US dollars in 
2009 (Hellstrom 2009). This placed China as Africa‟s third largest trading partner after the 
European Union and the United States. Within the same period, Chinese imports from Africa 
rose by 1380 percent (Princeton 2005). In 2005, the top ten African countries exporting to 
China were, notably the natural resource-rich states of Angola, Sudan, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, Egypt and Gabon (Rotberg 2008). In 2006, it was 
reported that Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China‟s leading oil supplier (Naidu 2007). Oil 
dominates China‟s trade relationship with Africa. Other Chinese imports from Africa that 
were on the top ten list included iron ore, cotton, diamonds, logs, platinum, cobalt, 
manganese, and refined copper, signaling that China‟s interests in Africa‟s extractive sector is 
in part aligned to the China‟s economic boom. The complementarity of the Chinese and 
African economies underpins the rapid growth in two-way trade with Africa exchanging raw 
materials for China‟s manufactured products. Although the trade structure has raised 
questions such as an OECD report warning of a “raw material trap” given the relative phases 
of economic development, the China-Africa trade relationship is considered largely 
unavoidable (Chen 2005). The challenge for Africa is to turn raw material exploitation into a 
foundation for sustainable economic development over the long term. At the same time, the 
World Bank has emphasized the advantages for consumers arising from the wide availability 
of low-cost Chinese manufactured products in Africa (Braodman 2007). In addition, China 
has become a key development donor and investor in Africa. The urgency and commitment 
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displayed by Chinese corporations has impressed their African hosts and injected a new 
dynamism into Africa‟s commercial processes. Evidence to this effect is seen in the various 
investment projects that are being negotiated with African countries. At present, reports 
suggest that there are more than 800 Chinese companies in Africa, ranging from big 
corporates to small to small enterprises, that have invested on the continent and whose 
operations cover an array of industries (Hellstrom 2009). Recently Beijing signed a 3 billion 
US dollars iron ore deal with Gabon, which includes the construction of a railway as well as a 
container port. According to the 2006 World Investment Report, FDI inflows to Africa in 
2005 reached a historic height of 31 billion US dollars from 17 billion US dollars in 2004 
(Naidu 2007). While the report goes on to highlight that this impressive increase of FDI 
inflows into the continent of Africa represented a historic growth rate of 78 per cent, which 
was primarily the consequence of a boom in the global commodity, it is clear that China‟s 
deepening involvement in Africa‟s natural resource sector, especially its demand for raw 
materials has been the stimulus for Africa‟s increased FDI inflows in 2005. 
While FOCAC has strengthened China‟s economic interests in Africa, it also provided 
Beijing with a platform to become a serious humanitarian benefactor to Africa. Since the 
formation of FOCAC in 2000, Beijing has waived more than 2 billion US dollars in debt of 
more than thirty African countries and trained more than 10,000 African personnel in both 
civilian and security sectors. It granted zero tariff rates for 190 products exported to China 
from sun-Saharan Africa, and engaged in peacekeeping operations in Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Liberia etc. It has also supported the African Union‟s peace keeping mission in Sudan 
(Dijk 2009). Under the African Humanitarian Resource Development Fund (AHRDF) 
established after the first FOCAC in 2000, the Chinese government has offered about 1,500 
scholarships every year for Africans to study in China, dispatched around 16,000 medical 
doctors to work in rural areas, and deployed 700 teachers to work in rural schools across the 
continent. More recently, through a memorandum of understanding signed with the NEPAD 
Secretariat, the Chinese government made a 500 million US dollars donation to the 
Secretariat for medical purposes. 
China‟s successful development model, grounded in strong state management of 
economic liberalization holds wide appeal in Africa, where states are seeking to escape the 
poverty trap. African states have been quick to respond to China‟s fresh approach and 
agreements on a wide range of issues have been concluded. Some states, such as South Africa 
have suggested common approach to maximize Africa‟s benefits, but most African states are 
satisfied with a bilateral interaction and the rewards which flow from this. 
A central element of the China-Africa relationship is the principle of equal rights and 
respect through which Africa can negotiate with China as equals, seeking mutually beneficial 
outcomes. Political conditionalities demanded by the Western donor nations hardly feature in 
China‟s African interaction (Brautigam 2009). Instead, the focus is on practical, realist and 
achievable objectives with a common development agenda. China‟s commitment to develop 
Africa‟s infrastructure, education, agriculture and economic development is interpreted as 
proof of China‟s intentions to assist Africa over the longer term, rather than simply seek an 
exploitative relationship based on oil and mineral extraction. Africa has welcomed China‟s 
FOCAC commitments to increase aid to Africa and to promote conflict resolution and 
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post-conflict peace-building in Africa. It is widely acknowledged that China‟s intervention in 
Africa over the last few years has significantly altered the continent‟s traditional dependency 
on the United States and former colonial Western donors (Alden 2007). Africa now has an 
alternative source of aid, trade and investment. China‟s commitment to non-intervention in 
Africa‟s domestic affairs and a determination to build partnerships based on equality and 
mutual respect are widely welcomed. Africa is not treated as a needy aid recipient, as Beijing 
rather seeks trade and investment partners on a continent predicted to have significant growth 
potential.  
 
THE CHALLENGES OF FOCAC 
 
The FOCAC framework certainly has encouraging propensity for mutual socio-economic 
benefits for China and Africa. But there are definite problems and challenges that assail the 
FOCAC process, and what it hopes to actualize. Some of these are inherent dangers that may 
undermine Africa‟s position in FOCAC. There are increasing reports of social protests rising 
in China as a result of the „collapse of the old safety-net‟ which has guaranteed employment 
but now has „…left some households vulnerable‟ (Ravallion and Chenn 2005: 2). In 2005, 
more than 3 million people took part in 58,000 social protests, an increase of over 15 per cent 
from the previous year according to official statistics. The disputes focused mainly on wages, 
social welfare problems, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and evictions (Lim 
2006). These demonstrations were aimed against the government‟s reform process and 
confirmed that the growing dissatisfaction amongst China‟s socially marginalized centered on 
the fact that the economic boom was not benefiting them. While these social protests 
demonstrate that there are increasing expectations for social justice, China‟s leadership has 
become keenly aware of the implications this will have if such expectations are not addressed. 
From this perspective it becomes important for the current Chinese leadership to be cautious 
about how much development assistance, concessional loans and grants, or for that matter, 
how many doctors, teachers and other professionals, it can afford to continue giving Africa. 
Despite the fact that China has become a „second generation donor‟, the Chinese leadership 
will have to consider how this may affect its political legitimacy at home. Since not all have 
benefited from Deng Xiaoping‟s famous call „to get rich‟, President 
Hu and future Chinese leaders can ill-afford to ignore the mounting social tensions that could 
endanger the future of China‟s political, economic and social establishment. Justifying to its 
people why it is supporting Africa‟s development programme while not building a viable 
social safety net for the poor at home, will be a hard task for Beijing 
As China increases its presence in Africa, its been exposed to confrontations in form of 
riots, attacks and other forms of economically and politically motivated violence that has 
been directed at Chinese citizens and investments in Africa. This is partly explained by the 
fact that Chinese companies have been inclined to take bigger risks than their Western 
counterparts and even looking for business opportunities in locations left vacant by others 
(Hellstrom 2009). While Chinese investments and citizens are at times the victims of 
indiscriminate violence and crime in high-risk rates, they have also been consciously targeted 
in several situations. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in 
Nigeria has been conducting attacks against the government for years on the grounds that the 
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oil producing areas do not receive a fair share of the oil revenue. MEND warned the Chinese 
and other foreign against investing in the Niger Delta area. More than a dozen of Chinese 
nationals from a variety of Chinese companies were kidnapped eventually, but were later 
released (Shinn 2009; Naidu 2007). Similar experiences have been the case in Southern 
Kordofan, which borders Darfur, where oil operations protected by Sudan‟s government have 
come under attack. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) seized Chinese oil facilities as 
a warning to China that its support for Khartoum should cease. 
Concerns are expressed that China is opportunistic, extractive and exploitative (Rotberg 
2008). Particularly in the extractive industry and Africa‟s development future, the behaviour 
of China has been labeled a form of new colonialism and neo-imperialism (Naidu 207). 
Discontent communities, in which Chinese enterprises operate, perceive the companies as not 
contributing enough to local economies and employment. Chinese entrepreneurs rarely 
employ local workers from Africa. They are rather accustomed to bringing labourers from 
China, and most management positions are filled by Chinese nationals (Anshan 2007). 
Importing Chinese labour to complete Chinese organized infrastructural and mining projects 
inhibits skill transfers and reduces indigenous employment growth. Africans and Westerners 
certainly complain. Examples of critique directed against China‟s role in Africa include is 
unfair competition by offering low-cost products. So many African markets are flooded with 
Chinese goods which are often of better quality and cheaper than local products. While some 
African consumers may be happy, parallel domestic industries, especially textile industries 
suffer as a result. This fact is evidenced by the two mass demonstrations in Dakar, one in 
support of Chinese merchants, the other in opposition (Anshan 2007). Similar protests have 
occurred in South Africa. In the case of South Africa, tensions dissipated when Sino-South 
African government discussions over the issue led China to unilaterally impose quotas upon 
its textile exports in order to allow the South African producers, time to make their products 
competitive. 
In the medium to longer term, China‟s engagement with Africa through FOCAC may 
be advanced or constrained by three scenarios that the World Economic Forum developed in 
2005. Especially the first argues that as the US and the EU become increasingly inward 
looking with regard to their economic policies as a result of protectionism and social 
concerns and the failure of the Doha Development Round, China may see increasing and 
strengthening regional ties with Asia as the more obvious way of keeping its economy 
buoyant and fulfilling its social responsibility. Predicting that Africa remains a primary 
exporter and fails to diversify its economic base, this scenario could mean that Africa remains 
at the margins of China‟s economic strategy. In reality Asia has more to offer China in 
meeting its economic expectations, that is, geographical proximity, a growing services 
industry and a skilled workforce which can help to reduce the production costs associated 
with China‟s growing ageing problem. While it is asserted that China will continue to expand 
its relations with Latin America and Africa, it is not certain that Africa can play a 
constructive role in China‟s geo-political and economic strategy in the way that Asia, or to a 
lesser extent Latin America, will do.  
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CONCLUSION 
The expanding Sino-African interaction under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation has been investigated. Since its inception in 2000, the Forum has acted as 
vehicle through which China-Africa relations have been strengthened. Through the Forum‟s 
process, China has cancelled Africa‟s debt. Expanded market access has also been facilitated 
providing a wide range of new opportunities for China‟s positive engagement with Africa. Be 
that as it may, there are definite challenges and realities that raise important questions about 
possible dangers that may undermine Africa‟s position in FOCAC. As a result of the 
imbalance in economic power between China and individual African states, the relations tend 
to echo the dependency type of relationship, and reinforce the old model of state 
patrimonialism. Among other things, importing Chinese labour to complete Chinese 
organized infrastructural and mining projects inhibits skill transfers and reduces indigeneous 
employment growth. Doing so also breeds resentment as does the undercutting of local 
merchants and industrialists by the supply of cheaper Chinese goods or sharper 
entrepreneurial instincts. If Africans are to stand on equal footing with Chinese entrepreneurs, 
and ensure mutual gain in this new strategic partnership, they need to join forces and channel 
Chinese energies and capital in directions that benefits Africa as much as they benefit China. 
Developing an African Consensus is imperative. This will ensure an effective monitoring and 
regulatory framework put in place to oversee that investment practices are conducted 
appropriately and legally and most of all that their citizens are the main beneficiaries of this 
partnership. Only by fashioning a collective response can Africans throughout the continent 
turn China‟s massive and multifaceted drive into Africa to their sustainable best advantage.   
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